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The signalling game between 
plants and pollinators
Shan Sun1, Michael I. Leshowitz2 & Jan Rychtář2
Plants can send floral signals to advertise their reward for pollinators. Based on the presence or absents 
of such signals, pollinators can determine whether to visit plants. Plants can send dishonest signals 
but foraging behaviours of pollinators can limit the cheating strategies of plants. We model the plant-
pollinator interactions by the two-type Spence signalling game and investigate the conditions under 
which honest signalling can be established. In our model, plants either send costly signal or they do not. 
The cost of signal is dependent on the quality of plant. Pollinators can learn from the interactions with 
plants and can update their willingness to visit plants’ flowers to maximize their foraging efficiency. We 
find three general conditions that are required for the evolutionary stability of honest signaling. Those 
conditions are satisfied if there is (a) a high frequency of high-yield signalling plants in the population, 
(b) the balance between cost and benefit of signalling, and (c) high cost of dishonest signalling. Our 
model also predicts that other factors contributing to the establishment of honest signaling are the 
low abundance of pollinators, and the positive density-dependent and positive frequency-dependent 
relationship between plants and pollinators.
The cooperation between plants and their pollinators could develop through the exchange of rewards and ser-
vices. One of main problems deterring the establishment of cooperation between species is the existence hid-
den characteristics due to information asymmetry1: the plants know their own quality and can therefore behave 
accordingly, but the pollinators do not a priori know the quality of the plants. Specifically, plants often con-
ceal the reward (e.g. nectar and/or pollen) within the flower and pollinators cannot directly detect it. This type 
of pollinator-plant interactions with information asymmetry could be understood as a problem of “partner 
choice”1,2. Signalling could provide a mechanism to solve this problem1. The plants could signal their reward 
quality or quantity, and the pollinators could use the plants’ signals to determine whether or not to visit the plants.
In signalling game between plants and pollinators, honest signals are those that are positively correlated with 
the amount of rewards. The most honest signalling is the direct and conspicuous display of the reward itself 3. For 
example, the scent of pollen in Rosa rugosa4 and nectar in Penstemon caesius5, coloured nectar6, and the size of the 
visible gland secreting reward in Dalechampia schottii3 could be as visual and/or olfactory signals to the pollina-
tors. The floral traits that are uncoupled from the rewards within flowers could be as honest signals to advertise 
rewards for pollinators. The floral signals positively correlated with the amount of rewards have been documented 
for floral colour changes after post-pollination7,8, the size of petals and corolla-tube diameters in Silene virginica9, 
corolla tube length in Erysimum mediohispanicum10, petal length in Turnera ulmifolia11, symmetrical flowers in 
Epilobium angustifolium12, bract size in Dalechampia ipomoeifolia13, and floral scent in Brassica rapa14.
In plant-pollinator signalling game, the central question is how the honest signals have been established when 
the interests of signallers and receivers conflict partly. On the one hand, because floral signals and rewards are 
uncoupled within one flower, plants could reduce the cost by sending dishonest signals (signals with low cor-
relation to the amount of rewards)15. According to costly signaling theory16–18, the cost of signals is an essential 
element for stable honest signaling in any signalling scenario and it thus extends to the plant-pollinator interac-
tions. If the benefits for low and high quality signallers are same, the effectiveness of signalling depends on the 
strength of the correlation between the cost and the quality desired by the receiver: the cost must be higher for the 
low-quality sender1,17,19. When the signal has a cost, only good quality individuals will find it profitable to adver-
tise their quality, therefore the signal will be honest. On the other hand, pollinators usually rely on floral signals 
to assess the amount of rewards. The foraging behaviour of pollinators could lead to the honest signals offered 
by plants though repeated interactions with plants. Pollinators, such as bumble bees, not only learn positive or 
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adverse associations between floral signals and rewards20, but also gather the information about reward amount 
and use this information to improve their subsequent foraging efficiency in repeated interactions with plants21–23. 
The pollinators could remember the most profitable patches, and return preferentially to these21. The experienced 
pollinators, Bombus ignitus, could discriminate between rewarding and less-rewarding plants and return more 
frequently to plants providing high amounts of reward22. Bombus impatiens follow a Bayesian updating process 
to assess the degree of correlation between flower signals and rewards23. When pollinators could update the 
information about signal-reward relationship based on past experiences, the foraging behaviour of pollinators 
could limit the dishonest signals in by a preference for honest ones correlated to rewards in T. ulmifolia11. The 
hawkmoth pollinators, Manduca sexta, can make the adjustment of probing time in response to nectar volume, 
and that the self-serving pollinator behaviour can reduce probing duration and in low-nectar plants, resulting 
in reduced seed production24. Broom et al. (2013) have demonstrated theoretically that signal verification as 
self-serving strategy, which the receiver is able to verify the accuracy of the signal after it has responded to the 
signal, can lead to signal reliability by reducing interactions with dishonest signalers in repeated interactions25. 
The interaction frequency could determine the effect of the foraging behaviour of pollinators on plants.
However, it is still not clear whether the cost of signals combined with foraging behaviour of pollinators could 
make the honest signaling to be a stable equilibrium in the repeated plant-pollinator signalling game. In this 
study, we investigated theoretically the establishment of honest signals in repeated two-type Spence signalling 
game between plants and pollinators. The Spence signalling game captures the central feature of signalling game 
that strategic costs associated with signalling are required for honest signalling in the presence of partial conflict 
of interest19.
The Spence signalling game belongs to the family of the differential cost games (such as Zahavi16 and Grafen17), 
in which one type pays lower signalling costs than the other while both types gain the same benefits. The game is 
similar but not identical to the Sir Phillip-Sydney game18 which inspired a lot of models that investigate the condi-
tions of honest signalling (see for example Hurd26; Bullock27; Számadó28). Unlike the Spence signalling game, the 
Sir Phillip-Sydney game belongs to the differential benefit models, in which one type reaps a larger reward from 
the receiver’s response than the other, while the cost of signalling is same for each type of sender.
In our repeated signalling game, we assume that plants with different quality have different signalling cost and 
that they also provide different benefit for pollinators. In each visiting bout, the plants could either send the signal 
or not. Potentially based on the signal, the pollinator determines the probability to visit the plant. The probability 
of pollinator visitation could be updated based on the consequences for plant-pollinator interaction. Under this 
situation, we would explore whether the honest signalling can be established as evolutionarily stable strategy in 
the repeated game. Our model could provide the framework for using signalling game combined with pollinators’ 
foraging strategies to resolve the establishment of mutualism between plants and pollinators.
Model
For the sake of the simplicity, we assume that there are only two kinds of plants: (1) high-yield plants that provide 
benefit VH to the pollinators and (2) low-yield plants that provide benefit VL < VH to the pollinators. Let the rel-
ative frequency of high-yield plants be 0 < h < 1. Both kinds of plants can send signals to pollinators, advertising 
(potentially dishonestly) a high reward. A strategy for a plant is thus to signal or not (and it potentially depends 
on whether the plant is high-yield or low-yield). The cost of the signalling for a high-yield plant is CH, the cost of a 
signal for low-yield plant is assumed to be CL. The benefits of pollination are same for both the high-yield as well 
as the low-yield plants. We will later see that for an honest signalling (i.e. only high-yield plans signal) to develop 
in this situation, we need CL > CH (which is part of the Spence condition for honest signalling, see e.g., Fudenberg 
and Tirole29).
When a pollinator finds a plant, it checks for signals. If the plant is signaling, the pollinator visits the flowers 
with probability vs. If the plant is not signaling, the pollinator visits it with probability vN. We assume the visit 
takes the pollinator time TV. If the pollinator decides not to visit, it will take additional time TF to find another 
plant.
We summarize the notation in Table 1.
Whenever a pollinator visits a plant, it updates the visiting probabilities accordingly. To keep our model as 
general as possible, we will not assume any specific updating rules (see for example Cartar21; Makino and Sakai22; 
Biernaskie et al.23). However, we will assume that pollinators try to maximize their benefits based on optimal 
foraging theory30, i.e. the amount of food/rewards collected per unit of time. Since the high-yield plant provides 
the best reward possible, visiting a high-yield plant will thus make visits of plants doing the same more likely 
(whether the plant signaled or not). Reinforcement learning algorithms (see for example Sutton & Barto31) satisfy 
this requirement. We will explore the learning outcome of visit of low-yield plant in the next section.
The time lag between the response for the signal and its fitness returns can affect the learning that is the ability 
to update the template of the signal-reward relationship32. We will also assume that pollinators have sufficiently 
long time to learn, i.e. the values of vs and vN have converged to their expected (and fixed) values. Different learn-
ing rules may yield different results but we will assume that the expected values are between 0 ≤ vmin < vmax ≤ 1.
The game from the pollinator’s perspective is shown in Fig. 1.
The rewards for the plants will depend on how frequently their flowers are visited by pollinators. To be as 
general as possible, we will just assume that if a plant is visited by pollinators with probability v, the reward for the 
plant will be R(v) for some function R that is increasing in v. If the plant does not signal, the total net benefit for 
the plant will simply be R(vN) as there is no signaling cost. If the plant signals, the total net benefit will be R(vS) − C 
where is the cost of the signaling and it is either CH or CL, depending on whether the plant is high-yield or 
low-yield.
Just for the illustration, here are some possible reward functions. If a plant has just one flower and it can poten-
tially be visited by P pollinators, the potential reward function may be given by = − −R v R v( ) (1 (1 ) )single
P
0  
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corresponding to the fact that the plant’s flower is visited with probability − − v(1 (1 ) )P  and the plant receives a 
base reward R0 when a pollinator visits the flower. Alternatively, when the plant has many flowers (significantly 
more than P), and each pollinator visits only one flower, the reward for the plant is given by =R v R vP( )multi 0 . 
Clearly, there are many more possibilities for reward functions33,34. While both functions R v( )single  and R v( )multi
are increasing in v, there are some significant differences between the two functions. For example, for large P, i.e. 
when pollinators are abundant, ≈R v R( )single 0 is essentially constant while Rmulti is still linear with a constant 
slope.
Results
Here we show results of the ESS analysis. We assume that all (but a negligible fraction) of plants use a given strat-
egy and we derive conditions under which such strategy cannot be successfully invaded by negligible fraction 
of plants using a different strategy. Pollinators learn based on the experience with the plants they encounter and 
since we assume that potential invaders come in negligible fraction, the invaders will not influence the learning 
of pollinators at all.
For the majority of this section, we will assume that essentially all high-yield plants are signaling and essen-
tially all low-yield plants do not. In the following section, we will determine the long-term pollinator feeding 
rate, specify conditions under which pollinators should learn to skip low-yield non-signaling plants and finally 
determine all conditions under which honest signaling is evolutionarily stable strategy for the plants.
Long-term pollinator feeding rate. We are going to determine how long, on average, does it take the 
pollinator to receive a reward from a plant, assuming the pollinator visits only (signalling) high-yield plants. Let 
T denote the expected value of such a time. It takes time TF for the pollinator to find a plant. The pollinator will 
then visit the plant only if the plant is signaling (which happens with probability h as the only signaling plants are 
high-yield) and only if it decides to visit (with probability vS), i.e. in total with probability hvs. In all other cases, 
it continues to search. When the pollinator eventually visits the plant, it extracts the reward in time TV. This is 
shown in Fig. 2.
Thus, = + + −T T hv T hv T(1 )F S V S  and consequently, = +T TV
T
hv
F
S
.
The long-term feeding rate, i.e. the amount of reward collected per unit of time, of such a pollinator is then V
T
H .
Learning to skip low-yield plants. Skipping a visit of a low-yield (non-signalling) plant is beneficial for 
the pollinator if the instantaneous feeding rate V
T
L
V
 (should the pollinator decide to visit the plant) is smaller than 
the long-term feeding rate V
T
H . After some algebra, the condition V
T
V
T
H L
V
> , yields
V
V hv
T
T
1 1
(condition 1)
H
L S
F
V
> + .
 
Under (condition 1), pollinators will learn to skip low-yield plants, i.e. vN will tend to vmin Since high-yield 
plants provide the best feeding rate possible, pollinators automatically learn to increase vS and thus vS tends to vmax 
Consequently, (condition 1) eventually becomes
Symbol Meaning
VH Benefits to pollinators provided by high-yield plants
VL Benefits to pollinators provided by low-yield plants, VL < VH
h Relative frequency of high-yield plants, 0 < h < 1
CH The cost of the signalling for a high-yield plant
CL The cost of the signalling for a low-yield plant, CL > CH
vS Probability a pollinator visits a signalling plant
vN Probability a pollinator visits a non-signalling plant
vmax Maximal probability to visit a plant (signalling or not)
vmin Minimal probability to visit a plant (signalling or not), ≤ < ≤v v0 1min max
TV Time it takes pollinator to visit a plant
TF Time it takes pollinator to find another plant
T Expected time to receive reward from a plant (if pollinator visits only signalling high-yield plants)
R(v) Reward for the plant that is visited by pollinators with probability v
R0 Base reward for a plant when a pollinator visits one of its flowers
R v( )single An example of a reward for a plant with a single flower, = − −R v R v( ) (1 (1 ) )single
P
0
R v( )multi An example of a reward for a plant with multiple flower =R v R vP( )multi 0
P Number of pollinators that can visit a plant
Table 1. Explanation of used symbols and notation.
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> + .
 ′
V
V hv
T
T
1 1
(condition 1 )
H
L max
F
V
Conditions for benefits of signalling. The population where high-yield plants are signaling plants and 
low-yield are not will be stable if (a) a rare non-signalling high-yield plant will do worse than prevalent signaling 
high-yield plants, and (b) a rare signaling low-yield plant will do worse than prevalent low-yield plants. Part (a) 
will be satisfied if
− > .  R v C R v( ) ( ) (condition 2)H minmax
Part (b) will be satisfied if
R v R v C( ) ( ) (condition 3)max Lmin > − .  
Combining (conditions 2 and 3) yields a necessary condition CL > CH, i.e. it must be costlier for a low-yield 
plant to signal than it is for a high-yield plant.
For the illustration, if a reward function =R v R vP( )multi 0  is adopted, (conditions 2 and 3) become
< − > −C R P v v C R P v v( ) and ( )H max min L max min0 0
giving some concrete and testable predictions about costs of the signals. At the same time, if a reward function 
= − −R v R v( ) (1 (1 ) )single
P
0  is adopted and we assume large P, we get that ≈R v R( )single 0 for most values of 
v > 0 and thus it is possible that neither (condition 2) nor (condition 3) can be satisfied.
Other equilibria. There is also so called pooling equilibrium where no plant signals and where pollinators visit 
plants randomly. In fact, such an equilibrium exists and is evolutionarily stable under all conditions because when 
Figure 1. The game from the pollinator’s perspective. On average, it takes time TF to find a plant. Once the 
pollinator finds a plant, it visits it with probability vS (for the signalling plant) or vN (for the non-signalling 
plant), respectively. The pollinator spends time Tv visiting either type of the plant. Whenever the pollinator visits 
a plant, it gets a reward VH if it was a high-yield plant, or it gets a reward VL < VH if it was a low yield plant. The 
rewards for the plants depend on how likely they are visited by the pollinators and the reward functions are 
discussed in the text.
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only a very small invading fraction of the plants signal, pollinators will not be able to learn the meaning of the 
signal and thus they will visit all plants with the same probability (and it is therefore not beneficial to pay a cost 
to signal).
Situation when all plants signal is not evolutionarily stable. If only a small fraction of low-yield plant stopped 
signalling, the pollinators would not be able to learn the meaning of the absence of the signal, so they would still 
visit all plants with the same probability. Yet, the non-signalling low-yield plants would not pay the signalling cost, 
i.e. they would do better than the signalling low-yield plants and thus they can successfully invade.
Situation when only low-yield plants signal is not evolutionary stable either. If a small fraction of the low-yield 
plants stopped signalling, the pollinators would visit them more often (as often as they visit high-yield plants), yet 
the non-signalling low-yield plants would not have to pay the signalling cost and so they would do better than the 
signalling low-yield plants.
Because the pooling equilibrium exists independently of the above conditions 1, 2 and 3, plants may do better 
(or worse) in the pooling equilibrium than under honest signalling. Also, pooling equilibrium and honest signal-
ling equilibrium may coexists. Our model cannot predict which of the possible two is more likely to evolve but see 
for example Bergstrom and Lachmann35–37 and Zollman et al.38.
Discussion
We presented a simple yet general model based on the repeated two-type Spence signalling game between plants 
and pollinators. Our model is similar (but not identical) to the Sir Phillip-Sydney game18. Also, the analysis of the 
Sir Phillip-Sydney game using ESS and Evolutionary game theory as shown for example in Huttegger & Zollman39 
or Catteeuw et al.40 is similar to our analysis and authors arrive to similar observations (such as honest signalling 
must be costly).
In our model pollinators can learn and adjust their preference to visit signaling and non-signalling plants. The 
model was general in a sense that we did not use any explicit formulas for plants’ benefits nor any explicit learning 
or reputation model (see e.g. Silk et al.41; Catteeuw et al.42; Rich and Zollman43). Our model gave us three condi-
tions under that honest signalling is evolutionary stable equilibrium.
(Condition 1) or its equivalent (condition 1′) means that for the honest signaling to be stable, the relative dif-
ference between pollinator’s gains from the high-yield versus low-yield plants, −V V
V
H L
L
, should be quite large. If the 
difference is large, pollinators learn to skip low-yield plants in favor of searching for high-yield plants. Explicitly, 
the relative gain difference should be larger than T
T
F
V
 (a time to find a plant measured in units of time to visit a 
plant) times 
hv
1
S
 (which corresponds to the reciprocal value of a frequency to visit a high-yield signaling plant). In 
particular, high-yield plants should be abundant in the population (h should be large), and it should not be diffi-
cult to find a plant (TF should not be too large).
Condition 2 means that the benefits of attracting more pollinators outweigh the associated cost of signaling 
for a high-yield plant.
It is expected that investment in attracting the pollinators increases the fitness of the plants (via increasing dis-
persal and receipt of pollen) at least as much as the cost decreases it as plants may have less resources to produce 
Figure 2. Determining the foraging rate for the pollinators if they visit only signaling high-yield plants. It takes 
time TF to find a plant. With probability 1 − h, the plant is not high-yield and the pollinator keeps searching for 
the plant. If the plant is signaling, the pollinator may still skip it with the probability − v1 S (and then keeps 
searching for the plant). With probability vS, the pollinator visits the plant and spends time TV foraging on 
flowers.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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seeds and/or pollen44. The cost-benefit analysis of the signaling in D. scandens has been done by Pélabon et al.44. 
In D. scandens, plants provide resins secreted by a gland-like structure in the inflorescence as pollinator rewards, 
which could be honestly advertised through the size of resin-producing glands. The results of the experimen-
tal manipulation of resin production suggested that resin secretion has no cost in terms of seed production44. 
However, little is known about the costs of floral signals and more studies are needed to evaluate the environmen-
tal effects on production and maintenance of the reward costs. The synthesis of floral scent compound could be at 
the expense of reducing the synthesis of other amino acid-based metabolites14.
Condition 3 is satisfied if the cost of dishonest signaling is so high that attracting more pollinators is not ben-
eficial. It may so for several reasons
•	 R v( )min  may already be relatively close to R v( )max  – potentially if the low-yield plants can be pollinated by wind 
etc. and do not really need pollinators so much. This may also be the case of pollinators’ abundance if the 
reward function for plants behave like Rsingle, i.e. if it is close to constant when pollinators are abundant.
•	 CL is prohibitively large for low-yield plants. The production of signal and reward is costly and resource 
limited14. The plants with a low resource allocation to flowers can’t afford to produce the signals and large 
rewards.
Note that Leshowitz (MA thesis 2017 at UNCG) built a very similar model but did not consider the times it 
takes to extract the reward and times it takes to find a plant45. Without considering the times, honest signaling 
was not stable equilibrium even if (conditions 2 and 3) were satisfied. Inclusion of the times and (condition 1) was 
the crucial part of this model that allowed for the honest signaling to be stable. The condition 1 indicated that the 
establishment of honest floral signals could be determined by the frequency of high-yield plants in the population 
and the encounter rates between pollinators and plants with different qualities. The encounter rates could be 
dependent on the density of plants. So the frequency- and density-dependent interaction with pollinators could 
determine the establishment of honest signalling.
Nevertheless, our model is simple and does not account for potential complexities. We assumed only two 
possible yields from plants, high and low, rather than a whole spectrum of yields (Spence signalling game can be 
extended for situation where plant quality is continuous, see e.g. Grafen 199016). We assumed that high-yield and 
low-yield plants are otherwise same or very similar (for example their rewards functions match). We also assumed 
only one kind of pollinator. We did not consider any dishonesty from the pollinator side (i.e. when the pollinator 
went for a reward, it provided the pollination benefit for the plant rather than somehow cheating the plant out 
of it). Another complication not considered by our model is that the plant with reward depleted by recent visits 
could send a dishonest signal if its signal is still retained. The pollinator, which subsequently visits this plant, need 
to be tolerant of flowers with variable return, reducing selection for honest signals15. The tolerances of pollinators 
are unlikely to impose selection on cost-enforced signalling46. Meanwhile, we also assumed that the pollinators 
have enough time to learn. But there is the cost of time associated with learning. For example, the time required 
to discriminate the nectar or nectarless flowers could influence the producing the proportion of nectarless flow-
ers in plants47. The existence of other equilibria could support an existence of the continuum from dishonest to 
honest signalling in plant-pollinator interaction. Meanwhile, it also indicated that pollinators’ learning ability 
and foraging strategies could determine the effectiveness for resolving partner choice by signalling mechanism.
We also assumed that the signalling itself does not attract pollinators more to the plants for further inspection. 
So, the frequencies of different types of plants determine the encounter rates. This assumption may not be realistic 
as the visual and olfactory signals can attract pollinators, which in turn means that real encounter rates do not 
match encounter rates at random. Nevertheless, our model can be modified if needed to account for the short-
comings mentioned above. For example, if signaling is in the form of scent and the scent makes plants easier to 
find for pollinators, the true meaning of h in our model will be the actual relative frequency pollinators encounter 
high-yield plants rather than the relative frequency of high-yield plants in the population. As such h can still be 
experimentally measured although the experiment set up will be different than if h means just the frequency of 
high-yield plants.
Testable predictions. 
•	 Honest signalling does not develop if pollinators are too common (plants get eventually visited and thus get 
their rewards even if they do not advertise).
•	 It could be expected that when pollinators are scarce, plants could invest greater allocation to attractiveness, 
which could be contributed to the establishment of honest signaling. In Alkanna orientalis, plants can increase 
resources allocation for floral traits and nectar to attracting pollinators in response to the spatial associated 
with fewer pollinating visits48. So, the honest signalling may be more common in pollinator-limited plants. 
Recently, some evidences showed that there is reduction of pollinator richness and density at a global scale49. 
Thomann et al.50 propose that plants could increase reinforced interactions with pollinators by increasing 
investment in attraction to deal with current pollinator decline50. This could provide the chance to test the 
prediction of our model.
•	 Honest signaling does not develop when there are not many plants for the pollinators (as it takes a pollinator 
too much time to find another plant, so it prefers to get its reward even from a low-yield plant).
•	 The density-dependent relationship between plants and pollinators is important for the establishment of hon-
est signalling. In Clarkia concinna, low plant density patches can limit pollinator attraction, resulting in repro-
ductive failure51. The high plant density can increase the encounter rate with pollinators. Under this situation, 
pollinators can evaluate the signal-reward relationship and prefer plants providing high returns. But when 
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plants were scarce, pollinators may not discriminate between flowers with different reward amounts52. So the 
establishment of honest signalling is dependent on the positive density-dependent interaction between plants 
and pollinators. We expect that the signal-reward relationship can vary with plant density.
•	 Even when plants already signal honestly, if there is a sudden decrease of plant frequency, pollinators learn to 
visit even the low-yield and non-signalling plant (because it takes too long to find another plant).
•	 Meanwhile, the establishment of honest signalling is also dependent on frequency-dependent interaction 
between plants and pollinators. Pollinators foraged at high-yield plants at greater visiting rates when high-
yield plants were at high frequency, and at lower visiting rates when they were rare53. So, at low frequencies of 
high-yield plants, pollinators will visit both types of plants indiscriminately. As the frequency of high-yield 
plants increases, pollinators are expected to avoid low-yield plants. Positive frequency-dependent pollination 
efficiency could promote the honest signalling. And negatively frequency-dependent selection mediated by 
pollinators could maintain the dishonest signals in plants53.
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